Bruce Jenner: The Interview. Publicity still from an episode of 20/20 aired on ABC on April 24, 2015. Bruce Jenner and Diane Sawyer.


As Diane Sawyer’s much-publicized interview with Bruce Jenner on April 24th illustrates, gender continues to be both highly individuated and highly regulated—“troubled,” to cite Judith Butler’s prescient queer proclamation—subject to a complex rehearsal of disciplinary patterns and emancipatory narratives that continue to seduce and evade pure cognition. In an effort to briefly think recent mediations of transgender bodies, we invited Paul B. Preciado, author of Testo Junkie: sex, drugs, and biopolitics in the pharmacopornographic era (2013) and a curator of the controversial MACBA exhibition “La bestia y el soberano” (The Beast and the Sovereign), to respond to an artforum.com Pop Quiz about the Jenner interview. (In keeping with his current self-identification, Jenner is referred to by the male pronoun.)

Bruce Jenner has been careful to separate his struggle with gender identity from struggles over sexual orientation. He’s also made clear that he doesn’t consider himself a “spokesperson” for trans experience. Where and how do you think Bruce Jenner’s “coming out” story and the attention it has received engages the current landscape of queer and trans politics?

The media frenzy around Bruce Jenner’s trans coming out shows that we are immersed in a binary gender regime where the possibility of moving between or outside gender conventions is still seen as a political transgression. We have to think about media (including social media) as a set of technologies that can be normalizing but that can also be critically reappropriated for resistance. Jenner is trying to find recognition within the dominant public sphere and this requires media normalization. This is why he is looking for a tactical recognition as a “good American parent” in an effort to resist oppressive transphobic discourse. Transsexuality threatens the stability of the heterosexual reproductive family, and so Jenner has to present himself in public as “asexual,” and speak about the well being of his family as his primary concern.

The transgender subject’s free use of the sexual body represents a threat to the heteronormative political management of desire. This regime always attempts to capture the transgender subject within its binary sexual economy, ideally as heterosexual—since the transgender subject unsettles the very possibility of this normative divide. Not only does this subject trouble the naturalized representation of the body within the visual epistemology of sexual difference (as an assemblage of visual signifiers), but so does its public gender performance—just look at all the crazy tweets concerning Jenner’s dress, as if a dress is like a terrorist’s “technology” when used by a body to whom male gender has been assigned at birth!

To cite Jacques Ranciere’s theory of democratic representation, I think we need to “invent a new scene of enunciation.” We need to radically reorganize the field of gender recognition within the public sphere.

How do you think Jenner’s early image as a paragon of Cold War–era masculinity—“the world’s greatest athlete,” the second Wheaties spokesperson—intersects with his current status as the “most famous openly transgender person in America”?

There is a discursive tradition that presents the M2F transgender subject as someone moving from a sovereign form of masculinity (often represented by sport or the military) to become a female media icon, as if both ends of the gender binary should be emphasized to make the transition part of a heroic act. Therefore, if the possibility of transitioning could question the binary logic, the act of perfectly embodying the extremes enables an ultimate naturalization of male and female positions. This is the case of Bruce Jenner as well as of others before in the twentieth century, starting with Christine Jorgensen in the 1950s (her transition was told as the transformation of an ex-GI into a “blonde beauty”) and with tennis player Renée Richards in the 1970s.

How does Jenner trouble or embody what you’ve termed pharmacopornographic era politics and labor? Is his interview with Diane Sawyer a consolidation of contemporary techniques of the body? How might we trace a trajectory from the early publicity around Christine Jorgensen’s transition sixty-plus years ago?

I understand the displacement from the disciplinary biopolitical regime of the nineteenth century (in which the notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality were invented) to the pharmacopornographic regime that emerges after WWII (where notions such as gender, transgender, and intersexuality are invented) as a shift within Foucault’s “apparatuses of verification,” or, to put it in Deleuze & Guattari’s terms, in “machines of semiotization”—of production of meaning. Whereas science and the law were once the main apparatus of verification, the market and the media have become the new machines of semiotization. This does not mean that science and law have lost all interpellating power, but rather that this performative force is now articulated with new technologies in the production of subjectivity.

As with Jorgensen, who in 1952 became one of the most photographed women in America, only comparable to Marilyn Monroe, what Jenner’s public transgender campaign shows is that the production of the “truth” of gender has become an affair of media management. We are now in the domain of the pharmacopornographic production of gender: Gender is both constructed through biotechnologies (such as hormones or surgery) but also through multimedia techniques. In other words, gender does not exist prior to its multimedia display. It is through the media’s disclosure and representation that the truth of Jenner’s gender is produced.

This is why a primetime interview is as important as surgery or hormones. Diane Sawyer’s encounter with Jenner could be read as just short of a media sex-reassignment operation. This act of political sex reassignment is not happening in the clinic or in court but on a TV stage and through responses on social media. Jenner’s interview brings together many historical narratives: on one hand, the rhetoric of legal and medical confession (which was already at work in the nineteenth century; see the case of Herculine Barbin described by Foucault in 1980) now staged within the framework of the TV interview. On the other hand, the codes of the freak show are reworked within the intimate “tête-à-tête” (seen by millions of viewers) between two women.

There is no linear relationship between the improvement of transgender civil rights and the advent of higher degrees of trans visibility in the mainstream media. Jenner’s jump to the front pages of magazines and to primetime TV is a paradoxical political displacement. It is at once a strategic move for recognition and a process of media surveillance and gender control. Nevertheless, it is within this narrow regulatory framework that Jenner must negotiate his new identity—by trying to rework abjection into political agency.

We need to see how the gender technologies that are producing Jenner’s transformation are the very same that most “cis” heterosexual women used in the West—at least after the 1950s: hormones (such as the pill), makeup, performance, sometimes surgery. The only difference is that transgender bodies are not yet fully recognized as political subjects within the binary gender regime. We could compare our gender regime to a highly orthodox theological one in which the idea of God can’t be questioned. In our contemporary, high-tech society, questioning the binary gender norm is our heresy. Genderqueer bodies are the new heretics.

Mazen Kerbaj, Je pense. . . Donc je ne suis plus! (I think. . . Therefore I am no longer!), 2005/2015.


A TRAUMATIC EVENT is one that defies our ability to tell what happened and at the same time sets off the desperate compulsion to do so, or at least to try, over and over, however awkward, until a story begins to take hold. A sharp, sudden eruption of violence—a war, an explosion, an attack—both does damage and repairs, by triggering the impulse to explain it, assign it meaning, and make it fit within the wider story we tell ourselves about the worlds in which we live.

In the months that have passed since three young men, two of them ex-convicts, gunned down the staff of a satirical magazine and patrons of a kosher grocery in Paris, killing seventeen people, including several artists—during which time another young man, also an ex-con, shot up a café and a synagogue in Copenhagen, killing two more, including a filmmaker—much has been written to put these events in context. With each new text, the narrative has thickened with nuance, anger, digression, and distraction, as writers, in accordance with their nature, have tied themselves in knots to make sense of the killings in terms of terrorism, religious intolerance, ideological indoctrination, postcolonial injustice, racial prejudice, economic depravation, government neglect, bad schools, terrible prisons, dangerous clerics, and the potential for radicalization among disaffected young men prone to messianic delusion.

In one way or another, all of these texts belong to what Adam Phillips, describing Freud, has termed “a long spiritual, religious tradition of crisis writing.” Perhaps that ever-expanding mass of storytelling, messy and oversensitive and argumentative as it may be, is truer to the experience of these events around the world, where reactions have been everywhere mixed, and nowhere the same, not even in the mind of a single person, to say nothing of the popular imagination of a single place.

In Europe and the United States, a story of the attacks has settled into a moment of much-needed but still dubious repose, as responsibility is passed to “moderate Muslims” around the globe to deal with religious extremism, reform their faith, and thicken their skin. “What is entirely out of the government’s control—out of anyone’s control,” argues Mark Lilla, writing about France in the New York Review of Books, “is what happens next in the larger Muslim world.”

This is true enough. But there are a great many cities out there in the not-so-distant, not-so-frightful Muslim world. In those cities, one might listen for the subtleties of a self-reflexive criticism and hear a brash and lively satire in return. One might discover a rich history of progressive ideas that have developed in close proximity to Islam over hundreds of years. Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul are three such cities. Others are just as relevant, but in these three, artists have established a particularly strong tradition of pushing public discourse. And in these three, regular people are dealing all the time with the kinds of dangers and ideological distortions that ripped through France and Denmark this winter.

The response has been complicated in Beirut, where I live, as it was and would have been anywhere. In the first week of the new year, when the brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi murdered twelve people commando style in the Paris office of the magazine Charlie Hebdo, the Lebanese capital was burning through its own drama, different but related. Last August, around thirty soldiers and police officers were kidnapped in Arsal, a town near the Syrian border, by ISIS and the Nusra Front, a branch of Al Qaeda that is active in the area. For months, the families of those soldiers and police officers had been staging violent protests, trying to force the Lebanese government to negotiate their freedom. The kidnappers’ key demand is the release of imprisoned Islamist militants, including from Fatah al-Islam, a group that waged a war against the Lebanese army eight years ago in a refugee camp outside the port city of Tripoli, an hour’s drive north of Beirut. This is just one sign among many that the apocalyptic freak show known as the Islamic State is also complicated, and not entirely new, with elements ranging from the disbanded Baathist military in Iraq to fundamentalist groups thought to have been wholly created by the Syrian state.

On January 9, the Paris attacks came to an end when French forces killed the Kouachi brothers in an outlying warehouse and then, at the kosher grocery, killed Amedy Coulibaly, who had reportedly pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State. On January 10, nine people were killed in a double-suicide bombing that took place in a crowded Tripoli café. The Nusra Front claimed responsibility. On January 11, vigils honoring the victims of the Paris attacks were staged in the French capital and cities around the world, including Beirut, where people gathered in a downtown garden named for Samir Kassir, the journalist and historian who was killed in a car-bomb blast ten years ago. On January 12, the Lebanese army stormed Roumieh, the country’s largest prison, and dismantled the notorious Block B, where Islamist inmates were said to have organized the Tripoli bombings (they had also become so powerful, well connected, and heavily armed that prison staff had not entered Block B for months). Nusra threatened to kill a hostage in retaliation. Four had already been executed, two of them beheaded. The families intensified their protests. Several schools in Beirut observed a minute of silence for the lives lost in France. Conspicuous in their absence were any such minutes of silence for the lives lost at home.

For anyone involved in art history, criticism, journalism, or contemporary art, the sites of the Paris and Copenhagen attacks—the weekly editorial meeting, the public talk on art’s relation to an issue of the day—were disturbingly familiar. The same can be said for the reason: a drawing, or several drawings, which caused offense and provided the pretext for a terrible series of actions. “Over a cartoon?” asked the Egyptian artist Ganzeer, incredulous on Twitter on the day of the Charlie Hebdo massacre. “A cartoon you fucking fucks???!?!??!”

Cover of Penguen, January 2015.


In Beirut, Mazen Kerbaj, who for years drew comic strips for the French magazine L’Orient Express and the upstart Arabic newspaper Al-Akhbar, dashed off two erudite cartoons. The first, updating Descartes, shows a man, intact in the first frame, saying “Je pense…” (I think), and then, with his head blown off in the second, “Donc je ne suis plus!” (Therefore I am no longer). The second: “Quand j’entends le mot revolver je sors mon stylo” (When I hear the word gun I reach for my pen).

In Istanbul, the three most popular humor magazines in Turkey—Penguen, Leman, and Uykusuz—published the same cover, all black with “Je suis Charlie” in a speech bubble, to mourn the deaths of their colleagues in France and to express solidarity with cartoonists everywhere. Death threats and hate mail poured in from social media. “Now we have a special security guard in front of the office,” says Cem Dinlenmiş, an artist who has been drawing a weekly cartoon for Penguen for nearly a decade. (His title, “Her Şey Olur,” translates loosely from Turkish as “Anything Goes.”)

Among artists in Cairo, Beirut, and Istanbul, the condemnation of the Charlie Hebdo killings was universal and unequivocal, as was the defense of free speech. In a region where intellectuals, journalists, and cartoonists have long been targeted for their work, people slotted the attacks into well-known narratives. The Palestinian cartoonist Naji al-Ali, known for his withering critique of Arab leaders and the creation of his much-loved character Handala, was assassinated in London in the summer of 1987, shot in the face outside the office of the Kuwaiti newspaper where he worked. In 2011, the Syrian cartoonist Ali Farzat, a harsh critic of the Assad regime, was kidnapped and severely beaten; both of his hands were broken. During the Charlie Hebdo vigil in Beirut, people added on to the “Je suis Charlie” hashtag: “Je suis Samir Kassir, Je suis Gebran Tueni, Je suis Riad Taha, Je suis Kamel Mroue.” The list of journalists cut down in Lebanon is long, and it echoes all over the region, in the assassination of the Palestinian novelist Ghassan Kanafani and in the killing of a generation’s worth of artists, journalists, poets, and playwrights in Algeria (not in the war for independence from France, mind you, but in the civil war of the 1990s).

Beyond the fundamentals, however, there is hardly any agreement—among artists or anyone else—on the issues raised in the aftermath of the Paris and Copenhagen attacks. The cartoons themselves, seen mostly out of context as they circulate online, have proven especially divisive. For most, they are difficult to defend, and easy to take personally—as Arabs, as Muslims, as anyone with ties by love or family to the Middle East. This has nothing to do with figurative representation or depictions of the prophet in Islam, “fruitless arguments,” as Dinlenmiş describes them. Artists in this part of the world know the history. (Nasser Rabat, a distinguished scholar of Islamic art and architecture, describes it at length in the current issue of Artforum.) Examples of Muhammad’s face and figure abound. For every source that tells you there is an absolute prohibition on picturing the prophet, there’s some anecdotal counterimage that blows your mind. Ayatollah Khomeini kept a portrait of Muhammad as a child in the sitting room of his home in Qom. A decade after his death, it was possible to buy posters and key chains in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar adorned with an unabashedly erotic picture of the prophet as a young man with a bared shoulder and a flower behind his ear, an image based on an old orientalist photograph by Lehnert & Landrock of a beautiful Tunisian boy.

Lehnert & Landrock, Portrait de Jeune Homme (portrait of a young boy), c. 1905–1906, original negative. Right: Poster of Muhammad as a boy. Artist unknown.


The Charlie Hebdo cartoons (like the ones in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten before them, and by the Swedish artist Lars Vilks) are something else—cruder, less interesting, and imprecise in the target of their humor. “The problem is that they are bad fucking caricature,” says Kerbaj, who adored the early, leftist era of Charlie Hebdo (and Hara-Kiri before it) until, courting readers on the right, “it was no longer funny and began to stink,” he recalls. (The art historian Yve-Alain Bois likewise captures the importance of Charlie Hebdo’s early days in the current issue of Artforum.) But depicting Muhammad as a dog, with bugged-out eyes and a huge hooked nose, with balls in his turban and a dick on his face—this is childish at best. At worst, it dwells in the same mean spirit as blackface, as jokes about the Druze being sneaky or the Jews being cheap. Such cartoons do nothing to deter, acknowledge, or even call attention to the horrors of the Islamic State or similar such groups. To the contrary, they are perfect recruitment tools. They fuel extremism on all sides.

What artists in Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul may bring to bear on these violent events—and the tumble of narratives that they engender—is an approach to comics, satire, and critique that can pull the debate elsewhere, into potentially more thoughtful terrain. Such people have a wealth of experience negotiating sensitive material into the public realm, where there is rarely any consensus on the rights of citizens or the role of the state. After all, these are cities where a jumble of religions have been living cheek by jowl for thousands of years, coexisting, intermarrying, and occasionally slaughtering one another too. There is something to be learned and a great deal at stake here, where all of the extremes that converged around Charlie Hebdo in January exist in the bureaucratic details of everyday life.

In the wake of the Paris attacks, the wife (or girlfriend) of Amedy Coulibaly was said to have slipped into Syria, where she was allegedly welcomed by the Islamic State. That minor plot twist is foreboding in itself, as if to suggest that when the news dies down in Europe and the story dwindles in the West, the uglier consequences of what happened in Paris will wash up on these shores. If they do, the work of artists—with their habits and traditions of critical inquiry, formal invention, improvisation on demand, and tireless energy for debate—will matter arguably more than any weak or strident calls for moderate Muslims to pluck an enlightenment, renaissance, or reformation from thin air.

El Teneen, poster featuring the command lilwara, Cairo.


Ganzeer is living in Brooklyn these days, and he was getting ready for his first gallery show in New York at the time of the Charlie Hebdo attack. He does a little bit of everything: stencils, murals, paintings, pamphlets, comics, installations, graphic design, a pair of booklets for the Egyptian revolution (offering tactical advice and a set of stencils for protesters), and a graphic novel that has long been in progress. Strictly speaking, he hasn’t drawn satirical cartoons in a decade, and he insists that he was never any good at them to begin with; he defers here to colleagues such as Andeel, Ahmed Nady, and El Teneen, whose Shepard Fairey–inspired poster of a sinister man’s bearded face above the command lilwara, meaning “regress” or “go back,” lends ambiguity a knowing edge that is absent from Charlie Hebdo’s Muhammad cartoons. But Ganzeer does make use of the language of satirical cartoons, and the sharpness of their humor, in works that take on everything from the duplicitous nature of Egyptian dictatorships to the false pieties of conservative Muslims. Prayer of Desire, a large-scale painting on wood from 2012, for example, shows a woman in prayer position with a stylized script above her conveying a slew of raunchy sexual desires. Several of his street murals highlight police brutality and the complicity of US foreign aid to Egypt. His criticisms of the army and the military regime—which were made very public in stickers, stencils, and posters—earned him an arrest, an interrogation, and a handful of death threats four years ago.

“In general,” Ganzeer says, “I find myself drawn to satire that while being funny is actually informative. In terms of legitimate targets, people of power and privilege are of course worthy of satire.” Less so, in his view, are people as people and the underprivileged. “There is clever satire based on some kind of information”—certain episodes in the life of the prophet would be perfect, he says—“and there is dumb satire that does nothing more than offer cheap laughs at the expense of a billion people around the world.”

On the formal efficiency of political cartoons, Ganzeer makes a surprising (and seemingly counterintuitive) point. Print culture in Egypt is huge. To this day Cairo boasts more than forty daily newspapers in Arabic, Armenian, English, and French, with a history of caricature dating back to the nineteenth century. “A satirical cartoon has a kind of instant power that lengthy analytical articles do not,” Ganzeer explains. The problem, of course, is that most of the newspapers in Egypt are controlled by the state, “which means people in power will not be subject to satire, thus perverting the very function and necessity of satire to begin with.”

Ganzeer, Tank vs. Bread-Biker, Cairo, 2011. Photo: JoAnna Pollonais.


“The funny thing is, I was never censored by the censors,” Mazen Kerbaj tells me on an evening in March, referring to the soldiers in the Interior Ministry who are tasked with policing the content of fine art and popular culture. “But I was censored by nearly all of the editors in chief in Lebanon.” At one newspaper, Kerbaj drew just four cartoons before quitting (two of them were never published). The only two editors with whom he could ever really work were Samir Kassir, who ran L’Orient Express in the 1990s, and Pierre Abi Saab, the influential critic and a founding editor of Al-Akhbar. “They both pushed me in this hardcore humor,” he says. “They were always listening to what I was proposing, and pushing me to do more. But I always said that what I was doing was social satire. I never did political cartoons per se. It was always about two guys or two girls, two bourgeois or two poor.

“I know—and I learned from censorship—how to go down different roads to arrive at what I want to say,” Kerbaj explains. “By the time I get there, it’s subtle. It’s no longer blunt. I could be very nasty in my attacks but I never wanted to attack these idiots,” he adds, waving a hand to mean Islamic extremists who are generally easy to provoke. “I wanted to attack you and me.”

At this point, Kerbaj is no longer drawing comics for Al-Akhbar. He stopped when he had enough material for a book, published as Cette histoire se passe (This Story Happened) in 2011. He still does a monthly cartoon for the supplement L’Orient Litteraire. And he is arguably better known as an artist and musician. Beirut’s Galerie Janine Rubeiz is currently showing the drawings he has made in collaboration with his mother, the painter Laure Ghorayeb, who is also an art critic for the Arabic daily An-Nahar. His next big project involves illustrations for an unpublished manuscript of a play by the Syrian poet Mohammed al-Maghout, which he found among the effects of his father, the well-known actor Antoine Kerbaj.

Curiously enough, of the two cartoons that Kerbaj posted on Twitter right after the Charlie Hebdo attack, neither was new. He drew both of them when Samir Kassir was killed in 2005. “It’s easy to do the same drawings forever in our region,” he says drily.

Left: Cover of Samandal, June 2008. Right: Cover of Samandal, June 2009.


Lebanon has a surprisingly strong tradition of mainstream caricature—epitomized by the work of Stavro and the late Pierre Sadek—as well as a culture of avant-garde comics, which, for outside observers who are not reading Arabic newspapers to plan their days, resides almost entirely within the more familiar precincts of Beirut’s contemporary art scene. When Kerbaj was growing up, in the 1980s, there was a group of artists working collectively known as Atelier de Jad. He was too young to join them. In 2008, the city’s first homegrown comics magazine, Samandal, appeared. Kerbaj has been a frequent contributor ever since. Founded by the artists Hatem Imam, Omar Khouri, Lena Merhej, Tarek Nabaa, and the Fdz (aka Fadi Baki), Samandal takes a broad view of what comics are, could be, and can do. There is also considerable debate among its members over the formal, experimental, and political imperatives of their work. (When a friend posted the “Je suis Charlie” hashtag to the magazine’s Facebook page in January, the discussion grew so aggressive that Imam removed it to make it stop.)

In terms of politics, sexual material, and social commentary, Samandal gets away with a lot—in part because the magazine is artsy, and in part because, as Imam explains, “most people think comics are for kids.” But the exceptions are costly. The magazine is in the midst of a long court case over two stories that ran in the “Revenge” issue in 2010. One of the stories illustrates an idiomatic expression that translates roughly as “Burn your religion.” The other deals with homosexuality and the history of Christianity. A local Catholic group filed complaints against the magazine. Samandal went to court and lost the case. The damages amount to around $20,000, which is no joke for the three founding members named in the suit (Imam, Khouri, and Baki). They are now in the process of appealing.

In January, they were also in the process of reinventing themselves. After taking a yearlong break from publishing, Samandal returned this winter as an annual publication (it had previously been quarterly), book-thick, with a theme and a tighter editorial focus. The first new issue, on genealogies, features contributions by Kerbaj, Akram Zaatari, and the late Moroccan artist and filmmaker Ahmed Bouanani, among others. In Samandal’s time, it has inspired and encouraged numerous other comics magazines throughout the region, including Tok-Tok in Egypt and Skefkef in Morocco.

Turkey is distinct in the Middle East for boasting a whole field of humor magazines that are comparable in their sensibility (if not their provocative style) to those in France. Perhaps for that reason, Dinlenmiş and his colleagues at Penguen felt closer to the Charlie Hebdo massacre than many of their counterparts in Beirut and Cairo. (But like Samandal, they also bump into political limits: Last month two of Penguen’s artists were fined for “insulting a public figure” in a cartoon suggesting the Turkish president was gay.)

Cem Dinlenmiş, Sakalar ve Gerçekler (Jokes and Truth), 2015.


Dinlenmiş, who is also a great painter, uses his work to comment on current events and to alleviate the misery they often cause. “The challenge is to come up with fresh narration and imagery when we’ve been talking about the same issues and problems, revolving around the same crises,” year after year, he says, “to express all these tiresome, boring, heartbreaking issues without wearing the reader out.” What are some of those issues? “Lack of democracy,” he says, simply enough. “But this is a long story to explain here.” Across the region, the predominant targets of political cartoons and satirical comics remain the authoritarian leaders who are still in power, despite the hopeful uprisings of the Arab spring and the cynical insurgencies of ISIS and its ilk.

In late January after Charlie Hebdo, the artist Tony Chakar, known to some as the troublemaker of São Paulo, floated a comment on Facebook suggesting that the problem with satirical cartoons was not their content but their form, and the lack of complexity inherent to it. Perhaps the kind of critique that could keep a conversation going rather than having it end in murder would demand different media altogether. And here the experience of Beirut in particular might be instructive, in the ways in which the makers of highly provocative work tend to negotiate their public gradually rather than throwing such work into the world.

Last December, for example, the Beirut Art Center opened its annual exhibition for emerging artists, which was disappointing, with the exception of one work, a video installation by Roy Dib (also an art critic for Al-Akhbar). To access the work, you had to ask for permission from the reception desk. Only a few people could enter at a time, and no photographs were allowed. This was due to the sexual content more so than its politics, but still. The artist Mounira Al Solh relies on similar strategies for a project she has been working on since 2006, a magazine called NOA (Not Only Arabic). Solh prints only one copy of each issue (two of which exist so far, with a third in progress). To read it, you have to make an appointment with the artist and sit with her while you peruse the magazine’s pages.

Mounira Al Solh, cover of NOA (Not Only Arabic), 2009. Illustration by Tala Madani, Arrested I.


In 2008, during the fourth edition of Ashkal Alwan’s Home Works Forum, artist Akram Zaatari organized a video program dealing with graphic representations of gay sex. The screening sessions were moved out of the forum’s main public venues and into the secluded private office of the architect Bernard Khoury. Zaatari preceded them all with a warning to the audience concerning what they were about to see. On a less than charitable day, one might consider such actions too careful or even cowardly, but the thing is: They are effective. They succeed where blunt provocations fail. The works are shown; a small number of people see them and talk about them and debate them, which leads to them being seen again, by more people, in a different and often slightly broader context, until they become truly public.

On one end of the niche-public spectrum, there is cabaret. Last summer, around the time the Lebanese soldiers were kidnapped in Arsal, the band Al-Rahel al-Kabir (the Great Departed) was performing a regular show at a small club in Beirut, featuring songs lambasting the worst of the regime’s despots and autocrats: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, self-styled caliph of the Islamic State; Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; the Egyptian military; the Assad regime in Syria. Khaled Soubeih, one of the founders of the band, is a journalist who studied classical Arabic music and is inspired by popular composers such as Sayyed Darwish. He didn’t set out to create satire, Soubeih says, but ended up doing so because of the surreal situation in the region, what he terms the “posthysteric” phase we are living through—“a regime exterminating its own people… resistance groups claiming victories on a daily basis while we are going through the toughest period ever, extremists killing people in the name of mercy.” None of this is normal, he says. “The best way to confront [these regimes and figures] is by making fun of them.”

On the other end of the spectrum, there is the lecture performance, which is especially popular among contemporary artists in Beirut. They use it often enough to embed a desired interpretation of a work into the work itself. But again, in practice, the form accommodates sensitive material without shutting down the rapport between an artist and his or her audience. Chakar is particularly fond of the form, and like Jalal Toufic and Etel Adnan, he often seeds his works with quotations, excerpts, and references to mystical texts. They function, for him, not as beliefs but as “allegories for understanding the present,” as he puts it. “There’s a fine line between believing them and treating them skeptically.” Of the work of certain Sufi mystics, he says, “I think it’s beautiful as poetry,” but the point is that “allegory, indirectness, and ambiguity are much more efficient” as critique. The real potential for radical critique in a year like 2015 may lie in those same Sufi thinkers (who were, after all, the original enemies and the biggest threats to orthodox Muslims such as the Wahhabis, who emerged in the eighteenth century, helped introduce the putative ban of images, and continue to inspire fringe groups such as ISIS). It might also require not the banishment but the malleability of ideas and practices that have come to us in some vestigial form from religion (including narrative itself). “I like to think of myself as a storyteller,” Chakar tells me. “This is not an easy thing. But a lecture performance is exactly that. We are all telling a story.”

Tony Chakar, The Eighth Day, 2008–. Performance view, Stedelijk Museum (Bureau Amsterdam), June 25th, 2011.


On the days when I worry about the world into which my eight-month-old daughter has been born—on the days when the news is terrible, seemingly unbelievable, and increasingly hostile to artworks and artifacts in the Middle East—I bundle her up and bring her with me to the Archaeology Museum at the American University of Beirut, one of the oldest institutions of its kind in the region, after the Egyptian Museum in Cairo and the Archeology Museum in Istanbul. There on the mezzanine level is a special display of amulets and talismans. I learn that these objects—as well as the spirits and superstitions they address—have been used for thousands of years, from the era of the Egyptian Book of the Dead. For a long, long time, the hand ornament has conveyed the transfer of energy and power; the eye has offered visions of another world. The rise of monotheistic religions in the region didn’t end but rather integrated the function of these amuletic objects. In Islam, they became carriers of texts, bearers of stories: Amulets were written down, rolled up, and slipped into cases to be worn as jewelry. I pick out a tiny, seated lion in red jasper, tell myself it’s for her, and try to imagine the stories we’ll tell each other one day about the events unfolding all around us.

Kaelen Wilson-Goldie is a critic based in Beirut.

Andrew Jarecki, The Jinx, 2015, six-part miniseries on HBO. Robert Durst.


“He who dares is he who dursts, and Robert Durst is certainly daring to expose himself, he is daring to kill,” says philosopher Simon Critchley, invoking the archaic past participle of the verb “to dare” when speaking of the famed scion of New York’s Durst family, also an alleged serial killer and recent subject of Andrew Jarecki’s contentious HBO documentary The Jinx (2015). Here Critchley responds to artforum.com’s Pop Quiz, accounting for the heights of Durst’s daring and our “admiration” for him.

What is the risk in aestheticizing murder? Are murder and aesthetics mutually exclusive?

One of my favorite essays is Thomas De Quincey’s “On Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts,” published in 1827. It’s written as a lecture—apropos of contemporary performativity, perhaps—for the “Society of Connoisseurs in Murder.” The thesis of the lecture is that all major philosophers have been murdered, and he gives gruesome details on these accounts. (Descartes was murdered by sailors as if he were a puncheon of rum.) The text is prefaced with this thought: How should one consider murder? De Quincey says that it is like a chamber pot with two handles: One could consider murder morally, as a bad thing, or, “as the Germans would put it,” aesthetically, in relationship to good taste. Following De Quincey, if we put aside questions on the morality of what Robert Durst did or didn’t do, and the legality of it, and we consider his actions aesthetically, it raises a different set of questions. What if we thought of these murders as artworks? It’s not particularly beautiful—the torso found in Galveston, Texas, for instance—but it’s powerful, and raises ugly questions about what intrigues us most about watching The Jinx. We can also ask, what do these artworks give us? What do we like or get off on in relation to these murders? The answer is: an intimacy with violence that we get extraordinary enjoyment from, but one that we find hard to acknowledge. We’re moral hypocrites about what we enjoy. We think that the murder and violence we see constantly serves some purpose, as an education or as warning. I think that’s crap.

Do you see Durst as a Shakespearean figure, or do you see other resemblances across history? What makes him so compelling?

It’s tragedy, for sure. But for me, it’s more Greek than Shakespearean. One way of looking at Greek tragedy is that you don’t really see the act of killing, which happens offstage, but you see the consequences of killing. You see murdered people displayed as tableaux, as with the murdered bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra. Durst’s life relates more to the Greeks because fate seems to be powerfully at work, especially fate as it’s articulated in and through the family. In this case, you have the mother’s suicide, the father’s indifference and coldness, and the key theme of the rivalry with his brother. With the last, there is a possible link to Hamlet: Robert Durst should have been king of the real estate empire—and he wasn’t. Douglas Durst slighted him and he’s never forgiven his brother for that. Robert Durst’s crimes are, in a sense, payback, but through fame. He has poisoned the reputation of the Durst kingdom forever.

Aristotle defines tragedy as “imitation of elevated action” or “of noble action”—namely, the only subjects of tragedy are people who have nobility. The question for us is then: If we don’t have kings and queens today, where is nobility to be found? In the United States it’s to be found, of course, in relation to money. We respect the rich. Here we have a real estate empire with a doom-laden fate. Tragedies also typically involve a curse: Oedipus is the curse of the prophecy. People in tragedies are cursed by the effects of the past—effects experienced as fate, which they are weighed down and oppressed by, and which they bring down upon themselves. Think of the Kennedys and their curse. Durst fits perfectly into this model—there’s a dance with fate that he’s playing throughout The Jinx. In a sense, he wanted to be caught, as people said in the series; he wanted to bring fate down upon himself because that would ensure his fame—his final victory over his brother.

Durst’s decision to call Jarecki and say he wanted to be interviewed from a legal point of view is crazy. So what does he want? He wants to expose all of this. All Good Things [Jarecki’s 2010 fictionalized account of Robert Durst’s crimes] wasn’t enough. Durst himself has to be the protagonist in his own show, and he has to, in the entertainment sense, kill them all. The final bit of the last episode of The Jinx is a masterpiece of television: He put himself into that situation with the hot mic—he willed that. Another element of tragedy is that he’s “jinxed” by fate—this was why he didn’t want to have kids. Because why would you want to continue that jinx?

Finally, the big philosophical question here is: What is Robert Durst’s agency? Is he free? Not free? In what does his freedom consist? For me, it consists in being able to fully bring that jinx down on him and everyone around him.

Jarecki’s All Good Things spawned The Jinx, which is of course a concatenation of all sorts of fictions (mostly Durst’s) in the service of a supposedly greater truth. Where do you think Durst’s own fictions intersect with our own?

For one, truth only emerges out of fiction. The Jinx is an elaborate construction of a narrative in a six-part documentary in which fiction touches the real, in this case the real of murdered bodies, of life extinguished. This is something that plays out over and against the real of what it means to be a person of noble character in the late twentieth, early twenty-first century in the US, which Durst embodies. But it’s not that truth only emerges through fictions but also that there are fictions in fictions, and this fiction is one that, when constructed into an artifice, has a powerful, monstrous effect.

There’s this mysterious word in Aristotle—katharsis. We think we know what it means but we don’t. In Aristotle, most of the uses of it relate to the purgation of bodily fluids, physiological processes like ejaculation and menstruation. We have an idea that in our relationship to art emotions are elevated and transformed when we experience “katharsis,” which is somehow ennobling and educative. This is supposedly why we need to teach people about art, theater, literature, and so on—it’s like Guinness, it’s good for you. Yet this is a terrible way to think about art. Katharsis is actually much nastier, more visceral, particularly in theater. And what Jarecki has done—his theater in the form of documentary—brings us into proximity with violence and gives us an intimacy with it, and we enjoy that, we like it very much. We don’t have to murder ourselves or other people. We’re saved that expenditure! But we get off on the experience; we get to take delight and joy in someone else’s downfall. Behind that is ultimately an admiration we have for that person. We see in him something that we want to be: indescribably rich and getting away with it. It’s ugly and that’s why we find it beautiful.

K8 Hardy, Outfitumentary, 2001–2011/2015, digital video, color, sound, 90 minutes. K8 Hardy.


How do we show up for life? On January 25, 2015, the New York–based artist K8 Hardy premiered her video Outfitumentary to an SRO crowd in a disused Lower East Side restaurant beneath Reena Spaulings Fine Art. The work, built from a rigorous (but not rigid), ten-year-long documentation of the artist’s quotidian looks, uses a simple premise to open onto something infinitely more complex: the vicissitudes and strange continuities of the self, the politics of queer and feminist manifestation, the way our presentation shapes or transmits or pretends a reflexive drama of interiority. Here the artist and filmmaker Elisabeth Subrin, a friend and onetime professor of Hardy’s at Amherst College, talks with Hardy about the thinking and thrifting behind this singular video.

ELISABETH SUBRIN: Fifteen years ago, when we lived down the block from each other, I remember you saying you were starting to make an “Outfitumentary.” I know for me sometimes the title comes first and it’s a way to organize things. Did you create a structure right at the beginning?

K8 HARDY: Yeah totally. The title really gave me permission to start the project. I was using my video camera all the time and decided that I should really tape what I was wearing.

ES: I’m curious about your specific choices on how you would document your outfit every day. You wanted the front and the back and a full body. Were there other rules or parameters?

KH: The main rule was to get one head-to-toe shot of my look as often as I could or felt like it. I also wanted to do a spin in the beginning, but that requirement faded. I just had this moment where I thought everything that’s happening is interesting and what we’re wearing is interesting and weird and I should just document it for ten years. That was my plan from the very beginning, “I’m going to do this for ten years.”

ES: Wow, I didn’t know that ten years was the plan from the get-go.

KH: Yeah. I remember thinking it would only be interesting if I did it for a really long time, to see what happened over time and to capture my prime. I didn’t think what I was wearing in the moment was hugely relevant, but I had already noticed how much my style had changed and knew it would continue to evolve.

ES: It’s funny to think that it was during that exact same time-frame that I twice documented our neighborhood. The first was right after 9/11, and then I revisited all the same locations near the end of the decade, also with strict formal rules of my own, and presented them as a two-channel piece where you see our neighborhood transform over eight years. I thought it (Lost Tribes and Promised Lands, 2010) would just be about gentrification and the political and cultural shifts over the decade, but what emerges in the retracing of my steps turned out to feel autobiographical too.

KH: Yeah, I was probably walking around the neighborhood in those outfits on the days you were shooting!

Elisabeth Subrin, Lost Tribes and Promised Lands, 2010, two-channel video projection transferred from 16 mm, color, sound, 10 minutes. Installation view.


ES: There’s precedence throughout art history for self-documentation on a regular, chronological basis. Structural films of the 1960s and ’70s, or Tehching Hsieh’s One Year Performance or Eleanor Antin’s Carving really influenced my experimental approaches to portraiture and (auto)biography, especially Shulie (1997) and Lost Tribes and Promised Lands. I was interested in how revisiting the past through structural repetitions would reveal different information about time over a certain historical period, and of my own evolving consciousness. Today it’s all about selfies and constant self-marketing and self-branding (speaking of the compulsion to repeat!).

Your decision to document yourself every single day with such structural rigor gives Outfitumentary an anti-selfie feeling. There’s a level of honesty and non-narcissism because you created so many rules. The feeling-states that emerge are so much more subtle and intimate because you’re not trying to get us to like you. You don’t work exhaustively to make yourself look “good” for the camera, you don’t recreate mainstream fashion or selfie poses, except kind of ironically.

KH: I really just wanted to do it for myself when I started shooting. I didn’t know if there was going to be an audience for it or if it would just be in some archive. Four or five years into it I had the sense, thinking about the footage that had accumulated, that it could be interesting as an artwork one day. I just wanted to get the shot. I think the head-to-toe thing and the distance from the camera gives it this structure that is more practical and not about my best angle or whatever.

You do see me get more comfortable with the camera over time. At first I feel giggly and that it’s kind of funny, then I get really super comfortable and confident. I try out poses but that’s exactly what you see, that I’m trying them and not holding them. I guess there’s an awareness that I’m just copying poses, which is what posing is. And then I get bored with it.

ES: There is this amazing relationship to your body over ten years. Your body moves a lot less at the beginning. As we watch your lifestyle change and we witness you working in your bedroom, then in your apartment and then having your studio—the first one’s the Whitney ISP Program, right? Then by the end you’re in a studio that has huge photographs that you’re working on. Simultaneous to this portrait of what it’s like to become an artist, there’s also this sense of what it’s like to grow up in your body.

KH: Yeah you end up seeing where I’m working, where I have the camera. It starts in my bedroom, and moves from apartment to apartment, and eventually travels into my studio. I would just shoot it based on logistics and having my video camera, I didn’t think the location was very relevant, except that I needed enough space to get a full body shot. So it ends up showing where I’m working at the time. And of course it also ends up that the locations tell my story as much, if not more, than what I am wearing.

ES: There’s something so beautiful and intriguing about that and the fact that you chose not to have other people in it. Now and then we hear the presence of a friend, but you’re always alone. That’s what you have to do when you’re an artist, is be alone.

There’s this sense of embodiment specifically as an artist. We don’t know what relationships you’re in. We don’t know what’s going on in your life. We just get this visceral, emotional affect that’s very subtle. Over the course of ninety minutes you start to notice very minute differences in your mood.

Sometimes I feel like with art the best work is when you trust your instinct and have absolutely no idea if anybody will understand it.

KH: I guess that was another parameter, that it was just me in the shot and no one else. There had to be some kind of consistency in the project. I wanted it to be a focused document and at first I really thought I was just capturing my outfit. As I became a better performer, I was more aware of the mood that I was capturing. Then it evolves into something very real and I’m able to be myself in front of the camera without any effort of performance. Sometimes I would indulge in a mood, but I always tried to bring myself back to my original intentions and the structural parameters I had set up.

K8 Hardy, Outfitumentary, 2001–2011/2015, digital video, color, sound, 90 minutes. K8 Hardy.


ES: It was like here you are at the end in what, 2011? You are sustaining both a practice and an aesthetic that’s committed to DIY. The camera footage is kind of crappy. You don’t spend a lot of time worrying about lighting. We hear room tone. You don’t style your room. We see these spaces that you live in.

It feels like an important document about what it means to be an artist in New York City during the Dot-com era, during 9/11, during Bloomberg, during this economic explosion and gentrification. I’ve thought so much about my students who moved to New York in the ’90s and since. It’s just like, how do you do it? How do you live in New York and make art without being sucked into corporate media or the commercial art world?

There’s a way that this feels like a very precious portrait of trying to survive as an artist in that time. I don’t know if you want to talk about that and also about exposing your own economic reality. You are not raking it in as an artist.

KH: I think it was really a feminist instinct to make this document. I didn’t know what my life was going to be like as a lesbian and an artist. There were only one or two generations before me, the trailblazers, and I would have liked to see more of their lives. It’s like saying, “Hey, I exist.” It’s also like saying, “Our lives are important!”

And it was a difficult time to figure out how to live, where to live, how to make work, how to pay the bills, and how to fucking survive in New York. I went through a lot of stuff, as everyone does, but I was always psyched to have been actually surviving. That’s definitely in it.

I made the video within the means that I had. At one point, my video camera was at the top of the consumer line and I wasn’t too much worried about the picture quality. I guess you capture something else when there is no production work to see through. It was bare bones. It was a bunch of non-decisions.

ES: What do you mean by that, by non-decisions?

KH: Well, I wasn’t trying to dress up the room or myself or put something on for the camera. I was like, “Okay. Let’s just get it.” I think that’s what makes it very real, is that I wasn’t putting extra effort into it. Plus I had set up the structure from the very beginning, so I really didn’t have any new decisions to make about the piece.

I became more aware of high fashion as time progressed. It’s inevitable in New York. All of a sudden you realize some people are wearing insanely expensive designer clothes. That never bothered me because I thrift-shopped since high school and had good style with really cheap clothes. Style is not all about what you are wearing. It’s your sense of self and maybe your swagger and…

ES: Affect?

KH: It’s affect and it’s shape. It’s volume and silhouette. It’s gender play and camp. I really enjoyed getting dressed and it kind of baffled me because it wasn’t supposed to be important to feminists. But then there’s always a way of getting anti-dressed. Thrifting is a huge part of my process, whether I buy anything or not. I love to do it. Plus it was the only way I was able to afford to dress. Forever … I mean even to this day. In New York the way you look there’s a real currency. I had fun with it. Still do.

K8 Hardy, Untitled Runway Show, 2012. Performance view, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, 2012. Left: Photo: Lutz Bacher. Right: Photo: Arnold Frugier.


ES: Looking at the hybrid forms you were creating in your outfits, like 1980s shirts with ’90s T-shirts with ’50s florals. It really is an art form. The height of that was your Untitled Runway Show for the 2012 Whitney Biennial. I’ve always known whatever you’re wearing I’m going to see it on the streets two years from now. At the most reductive you could say you have a postmodern approach to style. On the other hand it’s like you see shopping malls and thrift stores across the country over ten years being recombined in these different ways. All of it feels kind of like a “Fuck it! I’m wearing this because I like these combinations and what they mean, not because they mimic a certain new trend.”

KH: It’s totally commentary. It’s also practical because if you are thrifting, you have to stay ahead of the cycles and figure out what old pieces or patterns or cuts could be interesting. You can’t be Now from second-hand. I was also playing with identity and was part of a queer subculture that had its own codes that I wanted to document. There was a specific underground queer-scene look and that is how we recognized each other. We had to do a lot of messaging in real life at that time. We weren’t on Apps and phones with our sexualities. So that was part of my motivation. The secret and not-so-secret flagging, what happens in the everyday. I’m not a walking art piece but I wanted to capture this and be in control of it.

ES: And critique it. You are challenging expectations of fashion. You’re challenging the economy of fashion. You’re challenging questions of beauty. You’re challenging where one swings in the sexuality spectrum. I was curious if you could talk about sound. Is there music in every single shot?

KH: Not at all. There’s a lot of room tone and the background music that was just happening, that my roommates were listening to or whatever. As it goes on I do get more aware of the sound that is being recorded. There might be the news or television. Sometimes I would put on a song because I felt I could move to that song or express myself more or even dance to it. And sometimes it would just be what I was listening to at that moment.

My whole modus operandi was not to think too much about it and just do it. Nothing is really overthought. I mean, God, I wish I had better lighting. I really thought that camera was a lot better than it was.

ES: That camera that was like the size of your hand?

KH: It was a mini-DV camera and it was the nicest camera I could afford at the time. I had the idea that it was just such high quality. I mean—it was digital video! Still on a tape, but it was the newest format when I started taping. I mean, you taught me that you could shoot on anything as long as the idea was good.

ES: Like, it’s not what you wear but how you wear it. It doesn’t matter if you have the nicest camera in the world.

KH: Yeah.

ES: I think I had to learn that teaching students on VHS and wanting them to get excited about what they were making before they knew what three-point lighting was.

KH: Totally. I started on VHS 1/2” and 3/4” tape.

ES: One of the things about experimental film and video art is that we’re working on the margins of the industry and we don’t have those resources. But where you decide to make an edit doesn’t cost money. A relationship between sound and picture doesn’t cost money.

KH: Exactly. And all the old video art that I loved was shot on even shittier mediums, so I wasn’t worried about what I was shooting on at all.

ES: What you do physically in front of the camera doesn’t cost money. All of those things are rigorous choices, and there’s a lot of formal play. There’s a whole sequence where you’re playing in your editing with the lights being turned on and off. How did you handle ten years of footage?

KH: It was really hard. I thought I was going to finish in the summer of 2014, but it was so emotional and intense to look at all footage that I couldn’t. I just scrolled through the video for about six months before I could actually watch everything that I shot. I was so uncomfortable and embarrassed for myself. I didn’t have a breakdown but—I nearly did. It took me a long time until I could sit with it and make that cut. And a hard deadline.

ES: How long is it, the entire footage?

KH: About six hours or more.

ES: It’s like when you do your taxes every year and you have to go through every receipt.

KH: Exactly.

ES: It’s excruciating. Basically you were seeing every part of your history.

KH: I was seeing everything. Everything.

ES: Financial, emotional, breakups …

KH: Totally. I was seeing myself as I was seeing myself, or something like that, something very eerie.

ES: Medical history, everything?

KH: Yeah I could see really difficult moments and illness, things that didn’t come all the way through within my parameters. But also it was really embarrassing to watch myself so much. I’d become filled with huge shame balls. Eventually I was able to work with the footage if I tried to think about myself in the third-person. I would be like, “She deserves to take up space.” I really had to keep giving myself permission because it’s like yourself and you’re going to be, “Oh yuck embarrassing. That song? That outfit? I could leave that out.” But it’s all in there.

Then I also tried to keep the ethos of shooting it and not thinking and tweaking out too much in the editing. I made match-cuts and stuff like that to help it flow. Then to try to just get to what I was doing in front of the camera and give it a little space.

K8 Hardy, Outfitumentary, 2001–2011/2015, digital video, color, sound, 90 minutes. K8 Hardy.


ES: There’s one moment I wanted to ask you about. Sometimes your face comes really close to the camera because you want to show something you’re wearing on your face or you’re turning off the camera. There’s one time where you come and stare at the camera and you’re crying.

KH: Yeah that happened and I just stayed with the camera and got that moment. The close-ups were something I had to figure out in editing because they were something extra and not preworked into the structure. I decided that I had to stay true to my original intentions and reasons for capturing these extra moments. What did she want to show me?

ES: Was she this person K8?

KH: Yes she is.

ES: You wanted to be honest to her diary of the day?

KH: Exactly and to her intentions of that day. You see more of that because I cried in front of the camera for a really long time. The edits are fairly proportionate.

ES: Somehow the clinical distancing creates this intense intimacy, like the films of Chantal Akerman, but also it has a relationship to the more lyrical experimental films that I was showing you, even back to Stan Brakhage or Carolee Schneemann.

KH: I was definitely influenced by all that work and the way you have to shift your focus and expectations. I love experimental film and video. It’s a different reality, possibly even more like reality.

ES: You read about films by structural filmmakers like Michael Snow or Ernie Gehr and they sound so rigorous and rigid. Then you see Wavelength [1967], and you’re like, “This is kind of a mess.”

KH: Yeah—that’s low budget!

ES: The track-zoom…

KH: The zoom is weird and the tracking it’s like a little yeah.

ES: Like the works of the structural filmmakers, Outfitumentary allows a different emotional resonance to come up. It felt very emotional watching it, and part of it was because we weren’t being distracted.

KH: It was like an exercise regimen or something, I just kept chugging along and doing it. Still, there’s still like, oh, months missing here and there where I kind of forgot about it or maybe I needed to buy a new tape. Or I might have loaned the camera to someone to use so I didn’t get it. I knew if I was really rigid—“It has to be every day”—that I would just get annoyed with those rules and I wouldn’t finish it.

ES: When you describe a piece like this, it sounds very simple. I’m going to document my outfit for a decade. I’m going to show the front and back of me. It sounds like superficially it’s going to be about fashion.

KH: It sounds like it, but it’s really not.

ES: Right. It’s an incredibly unique way to create self-portraiture. I mean there’s precedence from the era, like Jonathan Caouette’s Tarnation [2003].

Elisabeth Subrin, Shulie, 1997, Super 8/video/16 mm, color, sound, 37 minutes.


KH: Well, for me there’s also precedence in your film Shulie, like how that’s a remake of a student’s film about [Shulamith Firestone], which is a document that we need to see but we can’t, so you made the document. It’s important to tell our own stories. That’s something that you taught me. I mean you were the one who told me I was an artist basically anyways.

ES: It feels patronizing to say I’m proud because it’s as if ...

KH: You should be proud.

ES: I am proud.

KH: The root of what you taught me is really in that piece.

ES: I could see it. I remember when you walked into my Intro to Film/Video class at Amherst when you were a sophomore at Smith. It was your first art class, and my first “real” teaching job, and your first videos… There was one when you wore thrifted cowboy gear and were confronting the camera from stalls in a women’s public bathroom. You were taking on your identity even there. It was interesting because you were actually shy. There was something that happened when you turned the camera on yourself. At that time there were all these first-person documentary narratives where you would hear women talking about their identity-based traumas in very literal ways. Whereas you used performance and your body as a way to talk and show your internal experience.

With Outfitumentary you’re like, “This is who I am every day.” Not just in the clothes you were wearing but in the way you presented your reality. I feel that this is a piece that people will find in the archives in one hundred years and say, “Oh, so this is what it was to be an artist at that time.”

K8 Hardy is an artist based in New York.

Elisabeth Subrin is a filmmaker and artist. She is currently in preproduction on the feature film A Woman, A Part and blogs at WhoCaresAboutActresses.tumblr.com.

Ethical Slut

02.13.15

Contessa Stuto, “Horny Lil’ Slut,” 2014, video, color, sound, 3 minutes 7 seconds.


CONTESSA STUTO, the Brooklyn-based rapper and founder of the Cunt Mafia, released her new single “Killing in Vain” within twenty-four hours of the release of New York cultural ambassador Taylor Swift’s “Blank Space,” two odes to messy love. While Swift’s litany of clichés about millennial coupling is characteristic of peers Katy Perry, Ariana Grande, and Selena Gomez, many of whom she apes with sheepish modesty, Stuto rejects the Swiftian promise of a happy norm with her “low-budget realness,” serving an aggro femininity that contravenes Swift’s suburban sameness with Dreamlandesque swagger. Stuto continues to splice romance with her characteristic huff, a way of rapping that leaves you with the sense that she has run out of both rhymes and breath, in her new video “Horny Lil’ Slut,” premiered here for the first time since YouTube removed it in December 2014.

In “Killing in Vain,” Stuto—“Count Contessa,” as Azealia Banks once crowned her—doesn’t rehearse the pop line on True Love so much as reinvent the genre in a gutsy ode to death-driven desire, putting Swift’s banality on blast: “I’LL TARE YOUR FACE OFF,” she spits. “DON’T MAKE ME FEEL IMCOMPLETE. The song, which mostly concerns the betrayal of an ex-lover, deals with how the physical intensity of desire fragments experience. “[T]ook me a long time to over come these / fears,” Stuto writes in the lyrics posted to her Tumblr, continuing later:

i feel my bones brOKE and
my body bleed to death and
I’m starting to feel something
-HURT-

Contessa Stuto, “Killing in Vain” (2014).

This deictic somethingness opens on larger questions regarding the language of desire, particularly in Stuto’s repeated insistence that it not make her “feel incomplete.” Part of the song’s energy is that it never seems entirely convinced that completion is really what Stuto’s after. The lyrics crack up in generative, insistent anger, often struggling to specify injury:

SO I’M
suffocating
delaying
my night slaying
wish he was the
man
killing in VAIN
for ME !!!

Rather, what is specified is what the man doesn’t (or can’t) do. Letting her bleed to death he fails—repeatedly—to meet the terms of desire: “cupid wasted his dart,” Stuto sighs. She continues with barbed fury, recalling the “sephora scent” of the woman with whom the man cheated. She screams: “I’m hell bent.” And headed toward hell. In an extended version of the lyrics not included in the recording, Stuto writes, “AND HE WANTS ME DEAD. / IM beTTER OFF DEAD.” I’m not convinced—nor is Stuto. She concludes: “I GUESS.” Cunt Mafia, after all, makes the rules, declaring who lives and who dies.

Contessa Stuto, “Horny Lil’ Slut” (2014).

This Mafia, Stuto’s rap and nightlife collective that includes Quay Dash and Cakes da Killa, recalls a project outlined by Germaine Greer in her 1970 essay, “The Politics of Female Sexuality.” Like Stuto, Greer countered male privilege with a seismic, renegade energy rooted in the taboo language of “pussy-power.” In “Politics,” she proposes a method for upending patriarchal structures by re-envisioning female sexuality as more than a mere “function of meat,” calling for a lexical revolution in how we talk about female bodies and desire. “It ought to be possible to establish a woman’s vocabulary of cunt,” Greer wrote, “prideful, affectionate, accurate and bold.” Later: “Cunt is a channel drawing all towards it. Cunt is knowledge. Knowledge is receptivity, which is activity.”

In “Killing in Vain,” Stuto calls for her man to kill in vain—a literalization of Greer’s diagnosis of male sexuality as a confusion of “aggression for power.” Set in a greasy restaurant and a singed backyard, the music video for “Killing in Vain” supplements this aggression with a vision of a cruddy New York antithetical to Swift’s shapeless, all-purpose Village. Stuto’s own complex sexuality finds its analog in the grit of the Brooklyn diner: Messy, anguished, she grabs at herself in mock frustration at love’s unresolved dramas (which, in this case of murder-inflected love, is exclusive to meat-space), serving food with indifference to her patrons. “I’m an arrow and Cupid wasted his dart,” she sings as the song shifts to a metal-inflected register. Cunt is knowledge is activity: “Break down my heart, and I’ll break you apart.”

In “Horny Lil’ Slut,” Stuto hijacks gendered vocabularies of shame, reclaiming “slut” as a restorative, powerful word for the production of female sexuality: “I’m a horny lil’ slut and I want to fuckin’ fuck,” she repeats in the song’s chorus. Later, Stuto declares that her man is her king, that she will show her “twisted fantasy” where he “finger-fuck the pink.” The video, filmed to look like it was made with a home tape recorder, features Stuto performing at a house party and concert, revisiting the anguished gestures of “Killing in Vain” in an orgy of bodies as Stuto performs around them in the washed-out effect of an old VHS recorder. With its jumpy camerawork, the video recalls the low-fi porn and leaked sex tapes of the (ritually resurgent) 1990s. “Horny Lil’ Slut” ends with Stuto tied up in rope before the video cuts.

Hercules & Love Affair, “My Offence” (2014).

Of course, Greer’s vocabulary exists. Last summer, Hercules & Love Affair released “My Offence,” a quasi-PSA on “cunt” featuring Juliana Huxtable, Bailey Stiles, Sam Banks, Stuto, and other performers, musicians, and artists. In the video, they discuss the word’s unique New York registers. Stuto laughs and drawls, “It’s the highest prowess of power, it’s called the pussy and the cunt.” The video ends with Huxtable stating that “the greatest ways to point out the flaws [of patriarchal society] is to live in a way that exists directly in opposition to that but doesn’t sacrifice the idea that I function, that I live, that I’m vital.” This oppositional vitality refuses the normsy manners of a post-Bloomberg city in thrall to a cultural ambassador whose only legible “politics” is a stance against streaming music and whose “Welcome to New York”—the opening track of her 1989—offers us a city entirely devoid of cunt. We need a new ambassador.

Andrew Durbin

Unknown painter, Sultan Muhammad Nur (calligrapher), The Mi'raj or The Night Flight of Muhammad on his Steed Buraq, Folio from a Bustan of Sa`di, ca. 1525–35, ink, gold, colors on paper, 7 1/2“ x 5”.


AT THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, in a gallery devoted to Persian and Central Asian art of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, is a small painting on paper from Uzbekistan that depicts the Mi’raj, or the ascent of the Prophet Muhammad to heaven. The prophet, wearing a blue tunic and a turban, his eyes narrow, with a beatific smile, sits astride al-Buraq, a steed with a human face. The angel Gabriel guides Muhammad from Jerusalem, in whose mosque a Qu’ran sits in a ring of fire, up to a paradise of golden clouds. Sensitive, intricate, alive with spiritual conviction, the miniature has been a touchstone for me since the Met’s Islamic wing reopened in 2011. It reminds me not only of the complexity and diversity of the world of Islam, but also of how utterly my country failed to reckon with that world’s realities in the years after 9/11, and instead joined a bogus Manichean showdown to justify an illegal war and an indecent power grab. Even depictions of the prophet, the ultimate us-versus-them schism, have a long and multifarious history that few seem willing to engage.

I’ve come back to that painting, from the mid-sixteenth century, in the days since the heinous murders of the staff of Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Several of the victims were artists, and two in particular, Jean Cabut (pen name “Cabu”) and Georges Wolinski, were iconic figures of French popular culture. Universal condemnation of their murders, though, has not stopped them from being misread, deprecated, or totally exploited in the English-language press. Soi-disant liberals, all too eager to throw themselves back into the shameful embrace of the warmongering right, have held up the drawings of Cabu and others as grist for clash-of-civilizations delusions. (Manuel Valls, the young, Blairist prime minster, declared last week that France was “at war with terrorism,” thirteen years after we started that lunatic errand.) Their opponents, notably young leftists with justified anxiety about the lives of Muslims and people of color in France and elsewhere, have traduced them—all too willing to relativize the deaths of their fellow writers and artists in the name of allegedly greater sympathies.

Might not art historians and art critics have a role to play in putting things to rights? It’s a testament to how badly things are going that even the murder of artists is not enough to get the art world to stand together, but Charlie Hebdo and its contributors deserve better. We who are all too happy to celebrate the obscenity of a Georges Bataille or Paul McCarthy have bridled at the images by Cabu and his slain colleagues. And we have been all too resigned to these artists’ subsumption into a martial rhetoric they would have despised—and mercilessly lampooned.

Left: Cover of Hara-Kiri (n°94, November 16, 1970). Right: Cover of Charlie Hebdo (n°1, November 23, 1970).


They have, after all, been fighting the establishment since the 1960s, at the newspaper’s predecessor Hara-Kiri: “a dumb, mean newspaper,” as its slogan read, which was shut by the French government after brutally mocking the death of Charles de Gaulle. Charlie Hebdo is a child of May ’68, and its irreverence, its anticlericalism, its sex jokes, and its cheapness have a deep political structure. Its intentional bad taste can be best summed up with the word gouaille: a rough Gallic impertinence, knowledgeable but dirty. One early issue of Charlie Hebdo led with a NASA astronaut holding up the heads of decapitated Vietnamese, captioned “Long live America.” “RACISTS HAVE SMALL DICKS,” screamed the cover of an issue in 1973. The cover of the Christmas number of 1975 called on readers to “Gun down the soldiers / Strangle the priests / Steamroll the cops / Burn the banks.”

The most enduring image from the early days of Charlie Hebdo came in 1971, when abortion was still illegal in France. That April, Simone de Beauvoir led a group of 343 notable women who declared they had terminated a pregnancy. Charlie Hebdo’s next issue featured a cover by Cabu depicting Michel Debré, the former prime minister and implacable opponent of abortion rights. “Who knocked up these 343 sluts?” asked the headline, to which an exhausted, jowly Debré responds, “I did it for France.” De Beauvoir’s text, which was key to the legalization of abortion in 1975, is still known today as the “manifesto of the 343 sluts”—Jeanne Moreau was particularly proud of that epithet—in caustic reclamation of women’s sexual independence against the church and the government.

Cover of Charlie Hebdo (n°21, April 12, 1971). Illustration by Jean Cabut (“Cabu”).


Il est interdit d’interdire. It’s necessary to consider the history, and more importantly the spirit, of Charlie Hebdo when coming to terms with its more recent images, especially the cartoons lampooning Islam. Charlie Hebdo has always been a profoundly anticlerical newspaper, and its ruthless mockery of the Catholic church has taken on renewed life in the wake of the Manif pour tous, a new revanchist Catholic movement aligned with the hard-right, distressingly popular Front National party. But Islam specifically came into the paper’s sights in 2005, when the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and set off a global crisis. The Danish paper is right wing; Charlie Hebdo didn’t care, and ran all twelve of the cartoons anyway, with a cover by Cabu in which Muhammad wailed, “It’s hard to be loved by idiots.” This was a trap. The Danish cartoons were extremely racist—the prophet with a bomb in his turban, that sort of thing. But Charlie Hebdo, eternal provocateurs, placed a higher premium on free expression than on the sensitivities of anti-racists or true believers, and so they went for it.

Free expression is not enough to explain why a newspaper with a decades-long commitment to fighting racism printed racist cartoons. To understand why they’d do this, you also need to appreciate France’s centuries-long tradition of anticlerical satire (bouffer du curé) on the one hand, and on the other the bedrock principle of laïcité that undergirds the French state and Charlie Hebdo’s political struggle. Laïcité, shakily translated as “secularism” and established during the Third Republic, is a militant separation of church and state that sits at the heart of French citizenship, and it is today a fraught enterprise. Unlike in the United States, where “freedom of religion” permits all sorts of exceptions—say, the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance—laïcité entails the total expulsion of all religion by the state: notably the wearing of the veil and yarmulke by schoolchildren, banned in 2004.

We are now on the central ground of international politics in the twenty-first century, the terrain of globalization and postcolonialism and religion and difference, and Charlie Hebdo’s in-your-face, up-your-ass images have a different tenor. In 2011, following the victory of an Islamist party in the Tunisian elections, the paper put a grinning Muhammad on the cover and retitled itself Sharia Hebdo; even before the issue hit the streets, its offices were firebombed. The next year, further cartoons of the prophet led the French foreign ministry to close twenty of its embassies. Nearly everyone has missed the joke in one of those: when the nude, coquettish Muhammad says, “And my ass, do you like my ass?”, he’s quoting Brigitte Bardot, the actress-turned-Islamophobic washout who calls French Muslims “invaders.” These were crude and gratuitous, just as cartoons of a crucified Jesus sunbathing in Saint-Tropez are crude and gratuitous, but their antagonism now functioned very differently. Suddenly it was the rightwing press defending Charlie Hebdo, among them the creepy Figaro editorialist Ivan Rioufol—who, on the radio last week, had the gall to demand that a Muslim panelist “dissociate” herself from the terrorists.

How did anti-racist, anti-military, anti-church artists end up, in the late 2000s and early 2010s, producing images that antagonized some of France’s most vulnerable citizens? It certainly isn’t because of any change in Charlie Hebdo’s political line—the paper angrily protested Israel’s incursions in Gaza, and ran a weekly column campaigning for the rights of undocumented immigrants. Nor can this be put down to a lack of diversity on staff: Mustapha Ourrad, murdered last week, was Charlie Hebdo’s longtime copy editor, and anyone watching French television these past few days will have seen the numerous tearful interviews with Zineb el Rhazoui, one of the surviving editorial members who got this week’s issue out on time. It was because of unresolved, perhaps unresolvable conflicts between the ideal of laïcité and the segregated reality of French life, and the unfeasibility in such a situation of what the French call second degré humor, which we might translate imperfectly as “ironic” or “tongue-in-cheek.”

Laïcité, which in the years after the Algerian war was largely embraced by North African immigrants in metropolitan France, has now become a cudgel by which immigrant- and Muslim-hating leaders dress up their exclusionary politics in the name of “equality.” (Those interested in the growing phenomenon of sectarian laïcité, and how xenophobia can disguise itself in the garb of tolerance, should read Edwy Plenel’s Pour les musulmans [For Muslims], an important broadside published last year.) In this, they have help from the jihadists: The monstrousness of al-Qaeda and ISIS is regularly trotted out by the French far right as the reason to, say, ban halal meat. And the laïcité of Charlie Hebdo’s images, whose mockery of religion is theoretically part of a battle for equality, is very hard to distinguish from the sectarian laïcité of the Islamophobes. When Cabu and Wolinski mocked the Church, it was clearly in an effort to build a new, freer France. When they mocked the Prophet, they were addressing new controversies with dated techniques: perhaps counterproductive ones.

Jacket cover for Sarkozy m’a expulsé, 2011. Illustration by Stéphane Charbonnier (“Charb”).


Whether second degré humor is possible in such circumstances is not clear. Charlie Hebdo’s ’68-era mockery may have no future in such an unequal society. But if you really want to call out racist cartoons, you would do better to start with Tintin and Astérix. In November 2013, the newspaper’s editor Charb wrote: “The current editorial team is divided among followers of the left, the extreme left, anarchism, and ecology. None of us vote. But all of us cracked open the bubbly when Nicolas Sarkozy lost.” Charb, murdered last week, worked with France’s largest antiracism charities, and many of his images mocked the country’s supposed blindness to race: “I’d love to hire you, but I don’t like the color of your…uh, tie!” To see how Charb, a proud communist with an Arab partner, a man who fought relentlessly for the regularization of France’s sans-papiers, has been transformed in certain English-language reactions into an immigrant-bashing white supremacist is to see just how easily second degré humor slips into out-of-context literalism. Remember too that Charlie Hebdo recently published a book, Sarkozy Deported Me, collecting 140 testimonies of undocumented immigrants who had come to France and who faced tragic, sometimes fatal hostility.

There is a dreadfully racist and Islamophobic press in France. This includes not just the usual assortment of nativist websites and radio stations, but also mass-market magazines such as Valeurs actuelles, which warns of a “secret invasion” of France by Muslim immigrants, or the even sicker Minute, an extremist magazine that celebrated Slobodan Milosević for “protecting us from an Islamist invasion.” One of the best-selling books of last year was by Éric Zemmour, a journalist who encourages the “deportation” of Muslims (the vast majority of whom are French citizens; deported to where?). It’s bad—but Charlie Hebdo is not at all in this vein. Its principal antagonist is not Islam, and absolutely not Muslims; it’s the Front National, the extreme right party that has surged in popularity over the past two years and that the paper attacks week after week. Hasty English-language reactions to last week’s crime have insinuated that Charlie Hebdo was somehow obsessed with Islam, or even took pleasure in antagonizing Muslims. On the contrary, the Prophet Muhammad appeared on only one cover in 2014 (and in an anti-ISIS cartoon, no less), while the Front National was flayed ten times. Cabu, in particular, was for decades an implacable opponent of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party’s first leader, who sued him three times. His daughter Marine Le Pen, who has a better-than-zero chance of ending up as president of France one day, has not had it easier. During her (successful) campaign to detoxify the FN brand, the artist Riss drew her taking a razor to her pubic hair, which was in the form of a Hitler moustache. When 366 African migrants died off the coast of Lampedusa, Charlie Hebdo unflinchingly called the disaster “the platform of the Front National.”

Or consider the cover of Charlie Hebdo on October 22, 2014 (FIAC week!), drawn by Riss, who was wounded in the attack. It depicts four child hostages of the Nigerian insurgent group Boko Haram, all of them pregnant. The headline reads, “The anger of Boko Haram’s sex slaves,” and the hostages shout, “Hands off our benefits.” This vulgarity and obscenity, we should say, is barely anyone’s kind of humor. Charlie Hebdo was only selling 30,000 copies a week and had severe funding problems. But to anyone with a basic command of the French political scene, the joke is clear: It is a simultaneous attack on both Boko Haram and French politicians, especially on the far right. The week before the cover ran, Hollande’s health minister had announced new cuts to family welfare programs, to which Marine Le Pen responded, “I’d prefer that we stop giving welfare benefits to foreigners instead of lowering them for French people…. When you have three, four, five, six kids, and you receive what adds up to serious money—that encourages immigration.” The image explicitly utilizes Le Pen’s racism and xenophobia for its own purposes. It deploys a proudly tasteless and obviously absurd premise (for after all, Nigerians don’t get French tax credits) to skewer the true oppressors of poor women, in Africa and in Europe.

Left: Cover of Charlie Hebdo (n°984, April, 2011). Right: Cover of Charlie Hebdo (n°1145, May, 2014).


This second degré style has been there from the very beginning, from the days of Hara-Kiri, and we have learned this week that it translates very badly. But to blame Cabu and Charb for the national failings they have been trying to diagnose and oppose—and to do so while their corpses are still warm—is perverse. The novelist Teju Cole, in just one of the “yes, but” reactions of the past week, drew a regrettable comparison between Charlie Hebdo and neo-Nazis in a web piece for the New Yorker. But a better analogy might be Christoph Schlingensief, the late German theater director recently exhibited at MoMA PS1: another leftwing, pro-immigrant provocateur whose favorite method was the amplification of his opponents’ lies and absurdities. His action Foreigners Out–Please Love Austria, 2000, staged a version of Big Brother in Vienna’s central square; the contestants were asylum seekers, and Austrians could vote on who should be deported and who should get a passport. Too many spectators took it literally; one tried to burn the set down.

An art historical gaze upon the images of Charlie Hebdo would, first of all, reckon with the forms and the iconography of its cartoons within the context they arose—and only then wrestle with the images’ virality, slipperiness, and out-of-context force. I am not arguing in favor of every one of their cartoons. What I am arguing for is a more honest appraisal of the etiology of this monstrous crime, an acknowledgment of the particular French tradition of laïcité, and a recognition that these images’ recent worldwide propagation complicates our ability to read them. Images take on new meanings, new lives, as they move along global and digital networks; second degré irony recedes into premier degré literalism, with painful and, we now know, deadly effects. What is the responsibility of the creators for their images’ transformations along the chain? How do we think these images in the plenitude of their networked trajectories? Could some of the more offensive images be both racist and opposed to the racist policies advanced by Le Pen and her cohort—not easily fixed in an imperialist rebus?

Le Pen was not welcome last Sunday, at the largest demonstration in the history of France: four million people, in Paris and in the regions, refusing the minimizations and the amalgamations of the past few days. Ariane Mnouchkine and her Théâtre du Soleil showed up with a giant puppet Marianne, bloodied but still standing. While jingoists put “Je suis Charlie” on their Islamophobic websites in the name of so-called liberty, the marchers’ “Je suis Charlie” and its corollaries—I am a Muslim, I am a Jew, I am a cop, I am French—evinced that last and highest of revolutionary values: fraternity, the unambiguous and undifferentiated love for one another that both the jihadists and our own warmongers fear. And on Wednesday Charlie Hebdo hit the newsstands, in a print run of five million, with the Prophet in tears. Its headline should guide all of us as we work our way through this era of accusation and retribution: tout est pardonné. All is forgiven.

Jason Farago

Press run of Charlie Hebdo (n°1178, January 14, 2014). Illustration by Renald Luzier (“Luz”).